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BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTERESTS: 
U.S. ARMS EXPORT POLICY
Since the end of the Cold War the export of arms and military technology has posed genu-
ine dilemmas rooted in the differing goals found in internal and international regulations of 
arms sales. The arms trade is no longer organized along the relatively simple lines of Cold 
War power politics, but is much more pragmatic and commercially oriented. The United 
States occupies a very large share of the international arms market, so its export control 
system and various aims of its foreign policies are based on a very delicate balance. From 
the standpoint of the domestic policy, there is a constant power game within this sphere 
between governments that bears full responsibility for the security threats posed by the arms 
trade, and military industry with its own, economic interests. In the field of international 
relations, selling weapons and related technologies is seen as an instrument that can be used 
by governments to achieve certain foreign policy goals. This article presents the historical 
and present day context of American arms export control policy and practice. 
Global transfers of arms have long comprised an important dimension of international 
affairs. Indeed, the supply of and demand for arms has existed for as long as war has 
been part of the world’s history. Since ancient times arms production and sales have 
been used to achieve the political, military and economic goals of states and rulers. 
During its long history the trade in armaments has been the subject of serious interna-
tional concern. The arms transfer issue is multidimensional in nature and technically 
complex. As it crosses multiple policy frameworks and theoretical levels of analysis, 
we can consider it as a challenge to our understanding of international relations. The 
nature of the arms trade appears contradictory. From the most pragmatic perspective, 
the international arms market is very lucrative. On the other hand, such activity under-
mines many basic foreign policy aims, such as security, human rights and international 
stability. Arms sales can relatively easily become an arms race, and then it turns to 
violent conflict or war. Arms production and export have always been seen as areas 
of national policy, in spite of the fact that they are largely affect foreign politics and 
are strongly rooted in an international context. There is a kind of Machiavellian logic 
behind assuring security, stability and freedom in the world, through massive arms 
transfers. The contradictions in this field are deepened by the fact that the biggest 
exporters of conventional weapons are at the same time the most powerful states, 
conspicuously led by the United States as the world’s main arms supplier (Grimmet 
2009: 1–6; SIPRI Yearbook Summary 2009: 14).1 Especially since the end of the Cold 
1  One of the numerous paradoxes of the international arms trade is the fact that five per-
manent members of the UN Security Council – the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, 
France and China are at the same time the most active players on the arms market, responsible 
for eighty-eight percent of reported conventional arms exports. The USA, Russia, France and the 
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War the export of conventional weapons has posed genuine dilemmas rooted in the 
differing goals found in internal and international regulations of arms sales. From 
the standpoint of domestic policy, there is a constant power game within this sphere 
between the government that bears full responsibility for the security threats posed 
by the arms trade, and the military industry with its own, economic interests. In the 
field of international relations, selling weapons and related technologies is seen as an 
instrument that can be used to achieve certain foreign policy goals.
The use of arms transfers to influence the international environment has long been 
a major feature in U.S. foreign policy, mainly for the sake of its position in the world 
arms market. The United States accounts for almost half of all international arms trans-
fers, dominates the arms market in the developing world, and has been a significant 
weapon supplier in more than half of current conflicts.2 Although some of the transfers 
have worked against U.S. objectives, arms exports have been seen as part of the game 
of world influence, and also as a way of establishing national and regional security. 
Such activity of the country is used to strengthen relations with partners within the 
international community and expand the sphere of influence. 
U.S. Arms Export Control Regime: History and Characteristics
National security export controls are an essential aspect of U.S. foreign politics. The 
system of conventional arms control promotes restraint, both by the U.S. and other 
suppliers, in transfers of weapon systems that may be destabilizing or dangerous to 
international peace. At the same time, the policy supports transfers that meet legiti-
mate defense requirements of democratic countries, and it’s designed to regulate the 
transfer of military items that might adversely affect U.S. military potential (U.S. Arms 
Export Policy 2007).3 Export control policies have an impact on the commercial side 
of the arms trade practices, but that is the base rule of the military governance. There 
has never been a free market in arms or military technology. 
The origin of the export control policy is unchanged in its basic structure from 
what was granted by Congress in 1940 as an extraordinary war power (Mendelsohn, 
Grahame 2002: 24).4 Earlier, arms transfers or significant military information were not 
UK are among the top exporters, while China is the leading receiver of weapons. The United 
States has been on the forefront of arms production and sales since World War II. According to 
the most recent version of the “Grimmet report”, global arms sales totaled nearly $60 billion in 
2007 and the United States was the world’s most dominant arms exporter, making $24.8 billion 
(41.5 percent) of all global arms agreements. Russia was ranked second, with 17.3 percent of 
all agreements. R.F. Grimmet, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations 2000–2007. 
United States Congressional Research Service, 22.10.2008; SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security – summary, <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009 > 
10.06.2009.
2  The term “arms transfers” refers to the sale and provision of non-nuclear military equip-
ment and support services.
3  See: U.S. Arms Export Policy, <http://www.clw.org/archive/atop/uspolicy.html> 12.03. 
2007.
4  In 1940 Congress increased presidential power over the export of military significant goods 
and technology with the passage of Public Law 703, “An Act to Expedite and Strengthen the National 
Defense.” The rationale for control was the necessity of not selling weapons to the nation’s enemies 
ad potential adversaries. See: J. Mendelsohn, D. Grahame, Arms Control Chronology, Center for De-
fense Information, 2002.
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subject to government control or supervision. Even despite the growing military threat 
posed by fascism and militarism in the late 1930s, U.S. companies were free to sell 
almost all kinds of warfare abroad. The Burton Resolution presented in 1927, which 
would have embargoed armaments exports to aggressor states, was opposed on “the 
grounds that it would weaken the private armaments industry of the United States 
on which the government of the United States relied heavily for national defence in 
times of emergency” (Krause 1995: 79).5 By the outbreak of the Second World War 
in Europe, the U.S. government had established control over private arms sales, and 
since then the export of arms has become for the government an instrument of foreign 
policy as well as a means of profit. This new role for arms transfers was inaugurated 
with the signing of the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, an effort to avoid direct American in-
volvement in the European war by promising instead that the country would remain 
the great arsenal of democracy.6 It enabled any country considered vital to the defense 
of the U.S. to receive arms and other equipment by sale, transfer, exchange, or lease 
(Collier 1980: 227).7 With that move, the foreign transfer of weaponry shifted from 
the private to the public sphere. In the 1930s American private munitions producers 
drew heavy criticism, accused of increasing militarization of the international scene 
and benefiting from deadly conflicts. At the end of the World War II, the Soviet Union 
emerged as a global power ideologically and militarily opposed to the democratic 
world. In considering the export control issue in the increasingly difficult West-East 
relations of the late 1940s, the United States sought to avoid or minimize the probabil-
ity of providing potential enemies with military tools and strategic technologies. Over 
the following years, U.S. arms export control policy was based on national security 
concerns derived from the reality of the global rivalry. The efforts were concentrated 
on building American and Western military capabilities and preventing sensitive tech-
nology and equipment from being exported to the Eastern bloc. 
When the Cold War ended, the conception and general aims of arms control began 
to change. Among arguments in favour of arms export, the economic one began to 
count more than the others. Since the beginning of the 90s, the international arms mar-
ket has been more commercially oriented than ever before. The current shape of this 
sphere is determined mainly by the national regulations and guidelines implemented 
by the leading actors of the global arms trade. Today the United States’ transfer policy 
5  K. Krause, Arms and the state: patterns of military production and trade, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995.
6  In his famous “Arsenal of Democracy” speech from December 1940 Franklin D. Roosevelt 
emphasized the need of American support to the allies. It is often interpreted as a renewal of 
the conscious effort of President George Washington to use arms transfers as a foreign policy 
tool designed to keep the U.S. at arms, length from direct involvement in any foreign conflict. 
President Washington cautioned the U.S. government against developing unnecessary politi-
cal ties with foreign nations in the quest for commercial expansion. See: L. Martel, Lend-lease, 
Loans and the Coming of the Cold War: a Study of the Implementation of Foreign Policy, Boul-
der: Westview Press, 1979.
7  Large-scale European orders placed during wartime pushed the American military in-
dustry into a phase of dynamic development. “Orders placed by the British and the French for 
aircraft, ships and explosives did far more to pave the way for (U.S.) rearmament that, anything 
the President or the Chiefs of Staff could have done before the Spring of 1940.” B. Collier, Arms 
and the Men. The Arms Trade and Governments, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1980.
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is governed by the Presidential Decision Directive 34.8 Decisions to approve a sale are 
made on a case-by-case basis. The working premise of the transfer policy is to arm 
allies while denying advanced military technology to potential adversaries – unstable 
countries, regimes, rough states. The United States recognizes its responsibility to 
ensure that transfers are only to meet legitimate defense needs of responsible states. 
A careful assessment of the purchaser’s security needs, the dynamics of the regional 
power balance and the potential to destabilize the region is made prior to approvals. 
The regulations implementing the export control regimes are numerous and complex, 
but three main laws provide the primary statutory mandate9: 
Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976: primary law establishing procedures on 
sales and transfers of military equipment. Defines the purposes for which arms may 
be transferred, self-defense, internal security and UN operations only, and establishes 
a process by which the executive branch must give Congress advance notice of ma-
jor sales. According to the AECA the United States and other “free and independent 
countries” have “valid requirements for effective and mutually beneficial defense rela-
tionships” and for “international defense cooperation.” The Act affirms that American 
policy is “to encourage the regional arms control and disarmament agreements and to 
discourage arms races.”10
Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961: act that governs U.S. activities to provid-
ing military and economic assistance to foreign governments. It gives the executive 
branch or Congress the right to provide funds (grants or loans) for the purpose of 
buying newly manufactured U.S. arms. FAA also prohibits the transfer of arms to coun-
tries that commit “gross and consistent” patterns of human rights abuse. It creates the 
possibility of giving away or selling at reduced costs surplus arms but forbide arms 
transfers and aid to specific countries for their pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion (WMD).11 
Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979: act that governs shipments of dual-use 
goods and technology (which can be used for both civilian and military purposes). In 
essence, the EAA requires dual-use exports to be approved through an export license. 
The Act expired in 1994 but it continues to be valid under repeated uses of the Inter-
national Economic Emergency Powers Act by the President.12 
Transfers of arms made by U.S. companies are controlled by the government to 
ensure that they are consistent with national security and foreign policy interests. The 
8  Presidential Decision Directive 34 rests on the foreign policy vision of the Bill Clinton Ad-
ministration. Arms transfer policy is largely influenced by the concept of trading within a broad 
“Circle of Friends”; based on the desire both to preserve the United States’ competitive capabil-
ity in arms production and to preserve national security through a strategy of engagement. This 
particular administration policy reveals a greater governmental share in the commercialization 
of U.S. arms and military technologies. See: I. Wilson, Today’s Profits, Tomorrow’s Losses: the 
Commercialization of US Export Reform and its Implications on National and Regional Stability, 
US Military Academy, October 2001.
9  See: USA: the Legal Basic for Defense Sales, SIPRI website: <http://www.sipri.org/contents/
expcon/us_legalframe.html> 12.03.2006. 
10  See: Federation of American Scientists website: < http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/
govern/aeca01.pdf> 12.03.2006. 
11  See: <http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/faa01.pdf> 12.03.2006.
12  See more: I.F. Fergusson, The Export Administration Act. Evolution, Provisions and De-
bate, Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, May 2006. 
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL31832.pdf> 11.03.2006. 
105BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTERESTS: U.S. ARMS EXPORT POLICY
Department of State bears responsibility for authorizing arms exports through export 
licensing. An exporter’s compliance with governing laws and regulations should be 
strictly monitored. The Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act govern 
several programs and founding mechanisms that allow U.S. weapons to be sold, given 
away or leased: 
The Foreign Military Sales (FMS): program that is the main channel through which 
“government to government” transfers are made. A foreign government buying weap-
ons through the FMS program does not deal directly with the producing company. 
The Department of Defense serves as an intermediary, usually handling procurement, 
logistics and delivery. The immense part of transfers is proceeded through this route.
The Direct Commercial Sales (DCS): program that oversees sales between foreign 
governments and private U.S. companies. A foreign country or company initiates 
contact with an American arms manufacturer directly. The State Department must ap-
prove DCS transactions by issuing a license. The commercial route is usually quicker, 
sometimes cheaper and always entails less government oversight than FMS. 
The Foreign Military Financing (FMF): this program uses grants or loans to pay for 
a foreign government’s U.S. military equipment and training purchases. FMF promotes 
U.S. national security interests by strengthening coalitions with allies, cements coop-
erative bilateral military relationships, and enhances interoperability with U.S. forces. 
The Excess Defense Articles (EDA): program that allows the U.S. government to 
transfer surplus military equipment to foreign military forces. Most of these not needed 
arms are given away. 
The Pentagon has been running a giant garage sale throughout the 1990s to unload its large 
overstock of dated, but still lethal, weapons and spare parts. EDA procedures are similar to 
those for FMS. Between 1990 and 1998 the Pentagon offered close to $8 billion of excess 
military items to foreign militaries. Among the leading recipients of free weapons through 
this program in 1996 were Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Bahrain and Tur-
key – all countries where serious political repression and/or human rights violations were 
reported” (Lumpe, Donarski 1998).13
The U.S. government may also transfer military equipment and technology through 
a mechanism called an “emergency drawdown.” The Foreign Assistance Act autho-
rizes the president to “draw down” articles and services from existing U.S. government 
holdings, budgets or arsenals without approval of the Congress. Here, arms can be 
granted to other countries for perceived emergencies, which would not be able to be 
transferred through other channels.14
Framework of International Arms Export Control
Arms exports, as strictly connected with major strategic policy of the United States, 
are subject to strict national regulation. The internal export control system reflects to 
some degree multilateral or bilateral agreements aimed at monitoring arms sales and 
13  L. Lumpe, J. Donarski, The Arms Trade Revealed. A Guide for Investigators and Activists, 
Washington D.C., 1998. <http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/handbook/cover.html> 12.03.2006.
14  For more see: Foreign Assistance. Reporting of Defense Articles and Services Provided 
through Drawdowns Needs to Be Improved, U.S. General Accounting Office, September 2002. 
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nonproliferation. The international regulatory regime first of all promotes transparency 
of dealings and allows countries to discuss their security concerns with one another. It 
is created also to ensure that military build-ups are indeed purely defensive and arms 
trade activity is not undermining common peace and stability.15 
The history of armaments export control has its roots in antiquity. It seems that 
humanity’s capacity for inventing, producing and using the tools of war-making has 
always been followed by efforts to control them. The earliest recorded disarmament 
conference dates back to the sixth century B.C., when a “cessation of armaments” 
ended seventy-two years of instability in China’s Yangtse River Valley. The treaty be-
tween Rome and Carthage, ending the second Punic War (218 B.C. – 201 B.C.) can be 
considered one of the most famous ancient arms control agreements. According to the 
treaty the Carthaginians were forced to surrender their entire force of war-elephants 
and fundamentally reduce their much-feared triremes. Old Testament prophets had 
a vision of a world where swords would be beaten into ploughshares. In April 1139, 
the Second Lateran Council, under Pope Innocent II, banned the use of what then was 
considered a shockingly destructive weapon – the crossbow (Delvoie 2001: 29–36).16
Although there are many more interesting examples where the issue of controlling 
conventional arms use and sales has been addressed in the past times, it is agreed that 
a conscious and systematic attempt to control weapons appeared in the 19th century 
(Mendelsohn, Grahame 2002: 14).17
Contemporary export controls trace back to World War II, but the origins of mod-
ern export control is represented by the creation of the Coordinating Committee on 
Multilateral Export Controls in 1949 (Cupit, Grillot 1997: 361–389).18
COCOM was a mechanism established by the United States and its allies to restrict 
arms and high-technology (non-only military) exports to the Soviet bloc. Although it 
was not strictly a non-proliferation regime, it established precedents and practices that 
were later incorporated into the proper non-proliferation regimes. Since the creation 
of COCOM, arms trade control has been coordinated multilaterally, but still under the 
specific international circumstances – on the supply side of the arms market, there was 
the ability of the major powers, the United States and Soviet Union, to influence or 
even control the flow of military equipment around the world. The main global adver-
saries, as rational players, shared a common interest in avoiding nuclear war. Accord-
15  The terms “arms control” and “disarmament,” though often used as synonyms, are not so 
in fact. “Disarmament” refers to the elimination of weapons systems, a far more comprehensive 
goal than “arms control,” which seeks to reduce the risk of war, its destructiveness should it 
occur, and the cost of military defense through agreements between states to regulate the devel-
opment, production and deployment of weapons systems and military forces. Arms control can 
be defined as any agreement among states to regulate some aspect of their military capability 
or potential. Early theorists defined arms controls in the broadest sense to refer to all forms of 
military cooperation between potential enemies. 
16  L.A. Delvoie, “Trials, Triumphs and Tribulations: the Saga of Arms Control,” Canadian 
Military Journal, 2001.
17  The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, initiated by the United States, was probably the 
most significant attempt to control major weapons in the first decade of the 20th century. This 
agreement limited the growth of capital ships among the major powers for over a decade. 
J. Mendelsohn, D. Grahame, op.cit. 
18  The British “navicert” system can be considered one of the signs of the new export con-
trol frames; see: R.T. Cupit, S.R. Grillot, “COCOM Is Dead, Long Live COCOM: Persistence and 
Change in Multilateral Security Institutions,” British Journal of Political Science, July 1997.
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ing to an early arms control analyst, Hedley Bull, “The fact that the United States and 
the Soviet Union were locked in a political and ideological conflict, one moreover that 
sometimes took a military form, did not mean that they could not recognize common 
interests in avoiding a ruinous nuclear war, or cooperate to advance their common 
interests” (Bull 1983: 22).19
With the end of the Cold War, activity on this field shifted to prevent the flow of 
advanced weaponry and military technology to potential enemies, rogue regimes and 
unstable and war-torn regions. Arms control has changed in accordance to the new 
international security agenda. 
Especially after the first Gulf War, there was an international attempt toward con-
ventional arms control because of the damage to international security done by the 
1980s arms build-up in the region (Hartung 2000).20 It was a period of intensive ex-
pansion of the concept of non-proliferation export control to address conventional 
weapons and dual-use technologies. In effect, COCOM was disbanded in 1994 and 
eventually replaced by the Wassenaar Regime established in 1996, called after the 
Dutch town where it was negotiated.21 
The goal of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms 
and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (WA) is to establish effective and respon-
sible national export controls, prevent the destabilizing accumulation of weapons, 
and agree on reporting regimes in order to improve transparency in the export of 
conventional weapons and dual-use goods. In this way, the Wassenaar Arrangement 
aims to contribute to international security and stability.22 Those are the official aims 
of the arrangement, but in reality the system is effective more in providing greater 
transparency of the arms trade. The Wassenaar Arrangement was signed by nearly all 
current EU states (except Cyprus) plus Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Japan, 
the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Ukraine and the U.S. The Wassenaar export control system is based on two main pil-
lars: a dual-use pillar and a conventional arms pillar. The principal goal of the regime 
is to complete information which will reveal any attempt to accumulate weapons or 
military technologies. In contrast to COCOM, the participants do not have a veto over 
other members’ transfers of controlled goods. There is also no consensus decision-
making on transfers. 
The United States and other main arms exporting countries also provide arms trans-
fer information to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)23 (King 
1999: 14). This U.N. mechanism, designed to control the trade in conventional weap-
19  H. Bull, “The Traditional Approach to Arms Control Twenty Years After”, [in:] U. Nerlich 
(ed.), Soviet Power and Western Negotiating Policies, Cambridge: 1983.
20  W.D. Hartung, A Tale of Three Arms Trades. The Changing Dynamics of Conventional 
Weapon Proliferation 1991–2000, World Policy Institute 2000, <http://www.worldpolicy.org/
projects/arms/reports/bh1000.htm> 12.03.2006.
21  A. Davis, E. Lynn, The Wassenaar Arrangement, Washington: U.S. State Department, 
1996, <www.acda.gov/wmeat95/davis95.htm> 10.03.2006.
22  See: Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods 
and Technologies, “Initial Elements” (adopted in 1996, amended in 1999, 2001 and 2002), http://
www.wassenaar.org/docs/IE96.html, 12.03.2006; S.A. Squassoni, S.R. Bowman, C.E. Behrens, Pro-
liferation Control Regimes: Background and Status. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, <http://
www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/other_us/crs021005.pdf> 03.03.2006. 
23  D.R. King, Interpreting Shadows: Arms Control and Defense Planning in a Rapidly Chang-
ing Multi-Polar World, INSS Occasional Papers 26, Arms Control Series, 1999.
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ons through enhanced transparency as a confidence-building measure, was created in 
1991. UNROCA invites countries to voluntarily report their imports and exports of main 
categories of conventional arms each year. However, the register is neither an arms 
control measure, nor does it provide a means of measuring the military capabilities.
Despite frequent critique regarding the international system of traditional arms 
control, and recent failures caused greatly through the behaviour of the United States 
(rejection of the Ottawa Convention, withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty), 
its role in shaping a multilateral system of arms transfer control is an important fac-
tor enhancing the global security system. The international community needs to have 
a framework in which to hold countries accountable for destabilizing international se-
curity through the transfer of conventional arms. It is important from a global security 
perspective that countries that have proven themselves irresponsible in the interna-
tional community and whose strategic goals may be potentially threatening to stability 
and peace, are to be somewhat constrained in their proliferation of arms and their 
own armament. Since the mid-1990s attention has increasingly focused on several new 
areas of interest in the security environment that call out for means of control, includ-
ing information war, landmines, space, illegal weapons and high technologies trade 
and terrorist activity (Levi, O’Hanlon 2005: 74–93).24 Efforts to reach a common point 
of view in many of these areas face great challenges, so likely the nature of the arms 
control and arms trade control process is still evolving. 
When the Policy Fails. The Consequences of Arms 
Export for Development and Security
of the Recipients in the Developing World
(...) we cannot have it both ways. We can’t be both the world’s 
leading champion in peace and the world’s leading supplier 
of arms.
Jimmy Carter 
As the leading arms supplier and as the world’s widely respected democracy, the 
United States seems to have a special obligation to set strict standards for the receiv-
ers of U.S. weaponry. The arms export control mechanisms described above are not 
always effective in preventing potentially risky arms transfers. In some cases the guid-
ing principle of the export is dominated by the commercial rather than the security 
aspects of U.S. interests. The breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold 
War led the U.S. government to undertake substantial cuts in defense spending (Wulf 
1992: 18; Kosiak, Bitzinger 1993: 3).25 At the same time the country assumed primacy 
in arms export, accounting for nearly half of all arms deliveries between 1992–2002 
24  M.A. Levi, M.E. O’Hanlon, The Future of Arms Control, Washington D.C.: Brookings In-
stitution Press, 2005.
25  It has been calculated that approximately one-fifth of worldwide defense-related employ-
ment – three to four million jobs – were lost by the end of the 1990s. The United States alone 
may have lost upwards of one million jobs in the military production sector. See: H. Wulf, “Arms 
Industry Limited. The Turning Point in the 1990s,” [in:] H. Wulf (ed.), Arms Industry Limited, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992; S. Kosiak, R.A. Bitzinger, Potential Impact of Defense 
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(Klare, Volman 1996: 39–53).26 In result of the strategic changes in the international 
environment the volume of arms trade increased sharply and the number of states 
participating in the global arms market also grew substantially (Grimmet 2001).27 Even 
with the decline in terms of the value of arms transfers at the beginning of the 1990s, 
the arms sales to developing countries comprised on average about two-thirds of all 
arms export agreements.28 
U.S. foreign policy has always emphasized the expansion of free markets and has 
promoted greater economic prosperity. In making decisions regarding the transfer of 
arms abroad, U.S. policymakers may be influenced by the trade ties with the potential 
recipient. Countries with vigorous international trade are often more financially able 
to purchase arms. But on the other hand, there is greater demand for weapons and 
military technology from countries that are underdeveloped and engaged in active 
conflict.
It is widely accepted that the purpose of any world trade regime is to raise com-
mon economic standards regionally or globally – rather than to maximize trade per 
se.29 In practice, however, these two goals – promoting living conditions and devel-
oping trade – have come to be treated as synonymous, to the point where the latter 
easily substitutes for the former. The international arms trade regime can’t be defined 
as development-friendly. Research indicates the inextricable links between arms trans-
fers and conflict on the one hand, and the level of poverty on the other (Mehrota, 
Vandeemoortele, Delamonica 2000: 16).30 For instance, a significant part of the crip-
Spending Reduction on the Defense Related Labor Force by State, Washington, D.C.: Defense 
Budget Project, 1993.
26  M. Klare, D. Volman, “From Military Aids to Military Markets,” [in:] S.W. Hook (ed.), For-
eign Aid Toward the Millenium, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996.
27  See: R.S. Grimmet, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations 1993–2000, Con-
gressional Research Service, 2001.
28  After peaking in 1987, world military expenditure has been falling. The end of the Cold War 
rivalry reduced the demand for new, particularly high-tech, weapons; it also meant that U.S. arms 
transfers could no longer be justified on the basis of stopping the spread of communist influence. 
Yet weapons manufacturers continued to produce weapons at the same rate. Overcapacity within the 
U.S. defense industry, after the Cold War, and reduced domestic demand, elevated the importance of 
export in sustaining the existing military-industrial base. This arms excess, and the defense industries’ 
continued overproduction, has created a buyers’ market for arms, which have resulted in a flood of 
sophisticated weaponry to developing countries. Developing countries’ spending has been growing 
since 1993–1994 and reached a new historic high of $232 billion in 1997. Developing countries’ share 
of world spending was 28%, rising from 17% a decade earlier. See: World Military Expenditures and 
Arms Transfers 1998, U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C., August 2000, <http://www.fas.
org/man/docs/wmeat98/index.html>18.03.2006.
29  The first paragraph of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization lists 
the following aspirations: raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and 
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand and expanding the production 
of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources 
in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and pre-
serve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their 
respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development, <http://www.wto.
org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf> 18.03.2006.
30  The UNICEF research indicates that most developing countries spend only 12-14 percent 
of their national budgets on basic social services. The World Military Expenditures and Arms 
Transfer (WMEAT) report publicizes that in 1999, on average developing countries spent 14.5 
percent of central government expenditures on the military. S. Mehrota, J. Vandeemoortele, E. 
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pling debt of developing countries results from arms purchases. Involvement in armed 
conflict has been a major source of debt in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, Sri Lanka, 
Sudan, Salvador and Uganda (Guns or Growth. Assessing... 2004: 25).31 In order to 
purchase arms poor countries cut public expenditures in health and education and 
borrow foreign exchange from international creditors. Some governments spend more 
on military expenditure than on human development, often ignoring basic needs of 
their societies.
Extensive arms sales may be responsible for entrenching and exacerbating poverty. 
They may encourage unaccountable and poorly trained military forces to suppress 
human rights and democratic development, facilitate brutal resource exploitation or 
contribute to environmental degradation (as in Sierra Leone where the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) used diamond sales to purchase weapons and fuel a campaign of 
terror. Such practices are also common in Liberia, Colombia, Angola and many other 
countries where the nation’s mineral resources are the best way for governments, reb-
els and military forces to finance their participation in the conflicts).32 
While all developing countries have the right to ensure their sovereignty using 
military means, extensive militarization and disproportion between social and military 
expenditures poses potential threats to their economic and social well-being. More 
than half the countries in Africa are affected by armed conflicts which are not tempo-
rary and have systemic and enduring features. The chronically poor increasingly live 
in situation of chronic insecurity. 90% of the wars since the Second World War have 
taken place in the poorest areas of the developing world.33 Of course the reasons for 
the poverty are complex and multiple, but governments’ large expenditures on arms 
occupy resources needed for public health, education and poverty reduction. While 
in some cases importing arms is required to meet legitimate security goals – goals 
which in fact can strengthen stability and support development – the contrast between 
the widening arsenal and spending directly on development is stark in much of the 
underdeveloped regions. There is a clear link between militarization of the economy 
and the chronic lack of human security or possibilities to escape from poverty. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, military expenditure rose by 47% in the late 1990s and life expectancy 
fell to 46 years (Guns or Growth. Assessing... 2004: 14).34 Half of the population of this 
region lives in dire poverty, despite the continent’s rich human and natural resources, 
and a fifth are affected by armed conflict. 
While the causes of conflict lie in political, economic, ethnic, and religious dif-
ferences, the increased availability of arms and military technology have made these 
Delamonica, Basic Services for All? Public Spending and the Social Dimensions of Poverty, Flor-
ence: UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2000; see also: WMEAT 1999–2000, Military Burden 
and Other Relative Indicators, U.S. Department of State, 2000. 
31  Guns or Growth. Assessing the Impact of Arms Sales on Sustainable Development, Control 
Arms Campaign, June 2004.
32  See: P. Collier, A. Hoeffler, Military Expenditure: Threats, Aid and Arms Races, World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 29, 27 November 2002, R. Draman, Poverty and Conflict 
in Africa: Explaining a Complex Relationship, Addis Abeba: Experts Group Meeting on Africa-
-Canada Parliamentary Strengthening Program, 2004, W.D. Hartung, B. Moix, Deadly Legacy: 
U.S. Arms to Africa and the Congo War, New York: World Policy Institute, 2000.
33  Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2005, Weapons at War, June 2005, <http://hei.
unige.ch/sas/publications/yb_2005.htm> 20.03.2006.
34  Guns or Growth. Assessing..., op.cit.
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conflicts more deadly and hinder efforts to rebuild war-torn societies. A good example 
in this could be the protracted Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, when previous weapons 
deliveries from the United States and other suppliers increased the scale of death and 
destruction in the conflict (Kisnella 1994: 573).35 Civil wars are far more destructive 
when their combatants gain ready access to arms not otherwise available. 
Such examples show that despite almost universal national control of the arms 
export and a variety of international organizations that attempt to regulate the interna-
tional trade in arms, the United States and other main suppliers still provide weapons 
that are used in ethnic and regional conflicts and negatively affect the economic and 
security environment of developing countries. Such practices gain a particularly de-
structive dimension in light of the war on terror that has dominated the international 
agenda.36 Paradoxically the main exporters are at the same time large donors to aid 
programmes in Africa and Asia. However, continuing arms transfers to developing 
countries undermine their chances of achieving progress in many areas. Instability 
and militarization of public relations have a significant impact on important social 
sectors, including health, education, infrastructure and communication. In the wider 
context, the increasing problem of proliferation of military technologies reflects the 
international community’s failure to formulate and maintain effective arms export con-
trol systems. 
While some military spending is inevitable for security reasons, in developing 
countries such expenditures compete with many aspects of civilian spending and have 
a negative impact on the rate of economic growth. Under the presented circumstances 
it seems that the United States as the leading force on the international arms market 
should take active steps to build a more effective and truly transparent arms export 
regime. It’s worth remembering the words of President Jimmy Carter when calling for 
unilateral arms export restraint in 1977: “Because we dominate the world market to 
such a degree, I believe that the United States can, and should, take the first step.”37
35  D. Kisnella, “Conflict in Context: Arms Transfers and Third World Rivalries during the 
Cold War,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 3, August 1994.
36  After the attacks on 11 September 2001 the U.S. government has increased its military aid 
to a wide group of countries. Some of the recipients of these arms transfers and military training 
are armed forces that have committed grave violations of human rights and have been identi-
fied in the State Department’s human rights records as having a “poor” human rights record. 
The list of recipient countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Colombia, Nepal and 
Taijkistan. In the cases of Azerbaijan, India, Pakistan and Taijkistan, arms trade sanctions were 
lifted. Sweeping Military Aid under the Anti-Terrorism Rug: Security Assistance post-September 
11th, Arms Sales Monitor No. 48, Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/asmp/
library/asm/asm48.html, 2 April 2006; see also: A Catalogue of Failures: G8 Arms Exports and 
Human Rights Violations, Amnesty International Report, 2003.
37  Arms Transfer Policy, Report to Congress for the use of the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, U.S. Senate 95th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977, p. 14, [in:] A. Ian, Arms export regulations, Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
tute, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
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